Alternative investment has grown considerably, transforming this industry in the forefront of investment innovation. Despite their public acknowledgment and profound influence in the financial market, there is still relative small understanding about hedge funds strategies style. This paper intends to determine whether stylistic characterization exists across hedge fund strategies, by comparing, for the period of 1998 to 2008, the performance of the EDHEC indices with one of the most representative indices of hedge funds, the CSFB/Tremont index, regarding seven main strategies.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past 60 years the alternative investment industry has grown considerably, transforming this industry in the forefront of investment innovation. Despite their public acknowledgment and despite their profound influence in the financial market, there is still relative small understanding about hedge funds strategies style.
The first mention of Hedge Fund remounts to 1949, when Alfred Winslow Jones launched an equity fund called A.W.Jones&Co.
1 His main objective was to make small net profits in all markets using leverage and combining short and long positions.
Today, the term hedge fund includes several investment strategies styles, and is best defined by their freedom from regulatory controls stipulated by the Investment
Company Act of 1940. Accordingly to the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, hedge funds provide exemption from regulatory oversight and investment restrictions implies restrictions on public advertising and solicitation of investors.
Despite the special media and regulatory attention, the term "Hedge Fund" has yet no precise legal definition. Nevertheless, the new hedge fund industry shares a series of common characteristics that distinguishes them from more traditional investment funds (long only strategies). Although these characteristics should not be considered as absolute signals, we can identify several of them: hedge funds are actively managed, have flexible investment policies, use unusual legal structures, offer limited liquidity most of the times, have limited transparency and target specific investors.
The variety of hedge funds strategies is challenging both to academics as to practitioners, which lies in understanding and benchmarking managers strategies whose underlying operations are essentially opaque, whose instruments vary widely and who in general have historically outperformed the underlying market.
However, in 2008 almost hedge strategies posted their worst losses 2 . Regarding the index of funds of hedge funds as an aggregate view of this industry performance, it is 1 See A. Jones(1949) 2 See Hedge Fund Week, as of 17.02.09, based on a report from Edhec Risk and Asset Management the first time since 1997 that this index has posted negative returns. The recent events marked by the worldwide financial crisis had a significant impact on hedge funds returns. Can this mean that finally hedge funds have followed strategic style purity, enabling us to detect style consistency and style deviation?
The purpose of this paper is to determine if stylistic characterization exists across hedge fund strategies. To do so, we ask two questions: Do the widely variety of hedge funds strategies follows basic styles? And if so, are pure style indices able to capture a significant percentage of the behaviour of the time-series of competitive indices?
To address these questions we study the performance of the "index of the existing indices", the EDHEC indices 3 and compare it with one of the most representative indices of hedge funds, the CSFB/Tremont index, regarding seven main strategies:
Convertible arbitrage, Emerging markets, Event driven, Fixed income arbitrage, Global macro, Long/Short Equity and Market neutral, during the period 1998 to 2008.
Our results may suggest that the purity in each studied hedge fund strategic style is not as developed and accurate as we may at first glance believe.
This paper is structured as follows. The next Section presents a literature review on the main issues of Hedge Funds, considering different strategies and the difficulties that arise from the biases in data. Section three describes the data and methodology of our work. Section four reports the results of our empirical analysis and Section five concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW Hedge Funds Strategies and Style
The first issue to address is that hedge funds through time failed to be a homogeneous group and are now a diversified range of investment strategies with very different risks and return characteristics. However, trying to understand their common nature and Research (27%) and MSCI (23%), followed by others.
Understanding the universe of hedge funds styles is complex, but for the sake of simplicity we decided to consider two important indices, the CSFB/Tremont and the EHDCE Alternative Indices, with historical data performance from 1998 till 2008. We do not aim to claim that these existing sources of outside classification are better than the existing others, but those are two indices that consider simultaneously the seven main strategies regarded in our study.
An extended academic research has been made through time regarding performance consistency in hedge funds strategies or styles. Fung and Hsieh [1997] for instance, report that hedge funds returns have low and sometimes negative correlation with the asset class returns of mutual funds. They attribute this discrepancy to the use of leverage and changes in asset exposure by hedge funds. Later on, Fung and Hsieh [2001] , based on Sharpe's model (1992) specified a style model, considering style factors as a main style whose characteristics are common to many similar styles.
(1)
Where R t is a fund's returns, (SF k,t ) are the style factors, and (b k )are the factor loadings.
Equation (1) They conclude that hedge funds managers can indeed outperform the market, but this is only due to one of the main characteristics of hedge funds strategies, that is, their ability to successfully regard market timing. They consider that market timing is inherent to the concept of hedge fund industry.
We hope our research, using two sets of transparent, rule-based indices, will help investor to better understand hedge fund industry.
The Biases in Hedge Funds Databases
According to An industry of this dimension can no longer be considered as before with total lack of transparency and rationalization. However the different indexes available on the market are still constructed from different data, according to diverse selection criteria and methods of construction. We can report instantly two main sources for biases regarding (i): the different way each database is constructed (i.e. net versus total fees, etc…) and (ii): by the fact that data/prices are supplied by the hedge funds individually regarded, meaning this a considerably lack of reliability due to lack of transparency. On the other hand, some Hedge Funds indices demands audit financial statements which will help in some way to reduce this lack of transparency and the manipulation of
prices.
An objective judgment of the best existing index is difficult to find, therefore, the use of some combination of competing indexes will allow us to reach a better understanding of investment style purity.
Self-Selection Bias
Hedge funds as private investment pools are not required (and are not allowed) to disclose performance or asset allocation to the public. Most hedge funds provide information to data providers, but only in a voluntary basis. This allows hedge funds managers discretionarily disclose the information they though to fit better their private interests. It is impossible to quantify this type of bias, although a similar study has been conducted by James Heckman [1979] in economics. No further academic research was found about this subject due to the considerably lack of information.
Database/Sample Selection Bias
According to the database sources selected or samples selection, we can find important performance bias. Liang [2000] reported this bias as a result of several mainly differences in returns, inception date, net assets value, incentive fee, management fee, investment style as well as survivorship bias.
Different criteria used by the hedge funds managers also cause sample selection bias towards some segments of funds. The option of reporting to some databases and not to other implies differences in the sample sets.
Differences in data collection methods between databases are also other important source of sample selection bias.
Survivorship Bias
Survivorship bias is other common problem when regarding historical data returns. A simple definition regards the fact that large number of hedge funds has disappeared or stops reporting information to data vendors during the time sample, and this may overstated the historical returns while understating historical risk. Therefore it is important to consider that hedge funds that contribute to the successfully performance over the past 10 years are not the same through time, and this constitutes a bias in the sample. Brown et al. [2001] observed that 50% of hedge fund managers disappear within 30 months, and only 4% have been in business for 10 years. Hsieh [2000b, 2001] , based on TASS data base, from 1994 till 1998, detected a higher value of 3%. Barry [2003] studied the same database from almost the same period, (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) and reported a survivorship bias of only 1,4%. What can explain those differences? Liang [2000] demonstrates in his study that the differences in database construction, the inclusion of funds of funds in data and the time differences in the samples, explain these discrepancies. This attrition rate tends to increase in bull or bear markets, as is stated by Brown and Goetzmann [1995] and Brown et al. [2001] .
They illustrated that this rate is influenced during higher moments of the distribution of returns and impacts the degree of serial correlation.
Backfill or Instant History Bias
Backfill or Instant History Bias happens when a hedge fund allows the managers to backfill their historical returns, considering that they do not exist in the database since their inception. Of course the mangers only choose to do so when this is favorable to their results, which provides bias to the past performance upwards. Barry [2003] studied the TASS database and observed that 80% of hedge funds backfill at least six months of data, 65% of all funds backfill at least 12 months and 50% backfill more than two years.
Academic research, Hsieh [2000b,2001] , Edwards and Caglayan [2001] and Barry [2003] , using several data bases during an average period of 1994 till 2001,suggest an estimate bias of 1,2% to 1,4% per annum, comparing the average returns since inception data with the average returns since the fund's reported data.
The CSFB/TREMONT INDEX does not suffer from this bias, since they do not allow data do be backfill.
Infrequent Pricing and Illiquidity Bias
Most hedge funds due to their strategy hold illiquid securities or securities that are difficult to price, causing the marking to market of this assets very difficult. Hedge fund Indices are often accused of heterogeneity and lack of representativeness.
Amenc and Martellini [2003] and the EDHEC Risk and Asset Management Research
Center suggested an original solution using all the relevant information containing in all the competing indices producing a set of stable, more representative, easy to replicate, non-commercial and with fewer biases indices. On average, Amenc and Martellini [2003] conclude that pure style indices are able to capture about 80% of the behavior of the time-series of competing indices. 
Source: Web sites.
Our decision to use EDHEC Risk Alternative Indices and with CSFB/TREMONT Indices, was based in Lhabitant[2006] where he studied the tracking errors for the seven strategies we use here and concluded that the tracking error was stable over time and Our main objective is to determine if different hedge funds strategies achieve statistical significant different media monthly returns through time or if we can not statistically confirm that. Therefore we use a test T of Student, for comparison of means of two pair's samples. We determined the p-value, as the probability associated with pair upped test T of Student with a distribution bi-variant. Generally, one rejects the null hypothesis if the p-value is smaller than or equal to the significance level.
We tested the null hypothesis with a significance level of 5%.
Where Δi = X i -Y i , being X i and Y i the two values of the pair number i, to compare. We are aware that the analysis developed in this paper could be improved in a number of ways, but our aim is quite simple for now: are hedge funds strategies consistent, producing different medias monthly returns in our sample, considering the monthly returns in percentage or not?
According to Table 2 , we may not reject the null hypothesis of equal media monthly returns on every strategy comparing the two sources of data. From Jan 98 till Dec 08, the difference is not statistically significant, with a significance level of 0,05.
More information can be detected when regarding the sample and excluding the year of 2008, where we may reject the null hypothesis for the strategy Equity Market Neutral. Another way of testing the consistency of different strategies was used applying a T Test to the possible pairs between the seven different strategies considering only one data source.
For the EDHEC Risk data source, as we can see in Table 3 , the null hypothesis cannot be rejected between the strategy Fixed Income Arbitrage and three other strategies, Equity Market Neutral, Global Macro and Event Driven. For all the other strategies, as
the Table 3 demonstrates, we can reject the null hypothesis. The media of the monthly returns of the other strategies are coherent between themselves. For the CSFB/TREMONT data source, something slightly different occurs as shown in 
For more detailed information please consult Table 5 in Appendix.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
While there has been significant literature regarding new models to predict hedge fund returns, quite little is known about the different strategies used and their coherence in the mean monthly returns.
According to our results we may not reject the null hypothesis of equal mean monthly returns on every strategy comparing the two data sources, EDHEC RISK and CSFB/TREMONT. From Jan. 1998 till Dec. 2008, our sample period, the differences are not statistically significant at a significance level of 5%.
We may then conclude that, between 1998 and 2008, we found no statistically significant differences between the mean monthly returns in the seven strategies analyzed. These does not means that there are no differences at all. We can see some differences in volatility, for instance, accordingly to Figure 1 and Figure 2 in Annex, but these are not the main subject studied in this paper.
Special reference must be made when comparing the two different data sources, or when we exclude the year of 2008 from our sample period. For these cases we suggest that some strategies should be studied more deeply, namely, the Fixed Income Arbitrage strategy, Equity Market Neutral and Event Driven, which, when comparing to several other strategies, reveal as being able to reject the null hypothesis. However we must not forget that the year of 2008 was known for special abnormal period in financial markets, and this of course is the main play field for hedge funds if the strategies are consistent.
Our conclusion remarks may suggest that the purity in each studied style is not as developed and accurate as we may at first glance suppose. 
ANNEX
- - - 0,000147736 0,273916251 0,047903262 EVENT DRIVEN - - - - - 0,600173444 0,014759256 EMERGING MARKETS - - - - - - 0,625940052 CONVERTIBLE ARBITRAGE - - - - - - -
Appendix 1
Information on hedge fund strategies accordingly with Martellini, Bied and Amenc [2002] Convertible Arbitrage: Attempts to exploit anomalies in prices of corporate securities that are convertible into common stocks (convertible bonds, warrants, convertible preferred stocks). Convertible bonds tend to be under-priced because of market segmentation; investors discount securities that are likely to change types: if issuer does well, convertible bond behaves like a stock; if issuer does poorly, convertible bond behaves like distressed debt. Managers typically buy (or sometimes sell) these securities and then hedge part of or all of associated risks by shorting the stock. Delta neutrality is often targeted. Over-hedging is appropriate when there is concern about default as the excess short position may partially hedge against a reduction in credit quality.
Emerging Markets: Invests in equity or debt of emerging (less mature) markets that tend to have higher inflation and volatile growth. Short selling is not permitted in many emerging markets, and, therefore, effective hedging is often not available, although
Brady debt can be partially hedged via U.S. Treasury futures and currency markets.
Equity Market Neutral: Hedge strategies that take long and short positions in such a way that the impact of the overall market is minimized. Market neutral can imply dollar neutral, beta neutral or both.
-Dollar neutral strategy has zero net investment (i.e., equal dollar amounts in long and short positions).
-Beta neutral strategy targets a zero total portfolio beta (i.e., the beta of the long side equals the beta of the short side). While dollar neutrality has the virtue of simplicity, beta neutrality better defines a strategy uncorrelated with the market return.
Many practitioners of market-neutral long/short equity trading balance their longs and shorts in the same sector or industry. By being sector neutral, they avoid the risk of market swings affecting some industries or sectors differently than others.
Event Driven: corporate transactions and special situations -Deal Arbitrage (long/short equity securities of companies involved in corporate transactions)
-Bankruptcy/Distressed (long undervalued securities of companies usually in financial distress)
-Multi-strategy (deals in both deal arbitrage and bankruptcy)
Fixed-Income Arbitrage: Attempts to hedge out most interest rate risk by taking offsetting positions. May also use futures to hedge out interest rate risk.
